1999 SYDNEY HARBOR, AUSTRALIA

On August 3rd, 1999, the Italian-owned tanker, Laura D’Amato (96,000 dwt) spilled 300,000 liters of crude into Australia’s Sydney Harbor at Gore Bay. The spill occurred after the tanker docked at Shell Oil’s Gore Cove terminal at the Clyde Refinery in New South Wales. Sea valves inside the tanker were opened when it docked at Gore Bay. The winds off the harbor soon spread acrid fumes from the spill across residential areas, prompting thousands of telephone calls to emergency services. The spill soon became major news, featured in local newspapers and evening television news shows. "The Big Spill — Stain on the Harbor," was the August 4 th headline on the front page of the Sydney Morning Herald. Sydney Harbor, the pride of Australia, had been fouled. Fortunately, the winds kept the spill contained for the most part in Gore Bay. Still, light crude was found along a 10-kilometer stretch of harbor shoreline and hundreds of birds were poisoned.

A massive response attended the spill, with more that 300 people and numerous agencies involved. The clean-up effort, which lasted for about three weeks, continued through the end of August. But shortly following the spill, on August 4 th, Shell Australia manager, Gary Smith, was quoted in the paper offering an apology to the local community. "We sincerely apologize to residents for the inconvenience they are experiencing from odors associated with the oil."

And that evening, on ABC-TV local news, correspondent Kerry O’Brien did a short interview with Shell manager, Doug Hyde:

O’Brien: . . . But do you know the extent to which Shell satisfies itself that the crew of the tanker unloading at your terminals are competent to do so?

Hyde: . . . If that is a shortfall in any of our processes, Kerry, that will come out in our own internal investigation and in the other investigations that will go on.

O’Brien: . . . Which you will share with us in the end we hope?

Hyde: We will.

The debate over responsibility for the spill began almost from the first day of the spill. Jim Starkey, head of the Australian Institute of Petroleum, said the spill might have been prevented if the Ship/Shore Safety Check List had been followed properly 22 — a procedure jointly shared by both terminal operator and ship captain. While the ship’s captain was later fined in the incident, and not Shell, some critics — among them, Friends of the Earth Australia — believed Shell’s harbor master was also responsible, citing a failure on Shell’s part to effec-tively implement the joint Ship/Shore Safety Checklist and ensure safe operating procedures. Friends of the Earth also charged that Shell’s responsibility and liability extended to the competency of the char-tered ship’s crew and safe operations at their terminal. At least one official, Peter Morris, Chair of the International Commissions on Ship-ping, and involved with a 1992 Australian inquiry into shipping and terminal operations, had also stated that oil terminal owners "have a responsibility to ensure that the vessel they hire does meet all the required international safety standards, and is operated in a safe manner." The Laura D’Amato spill, however, wasn’t the first incident at the Gore Cove terminal. In mid-July 1993, about ten tons of crude oil spilled into Sydney Harbor during a routine transfer between storage tanks at the terminal. A long slick on the harbor followed. After months of investigation, Shell was found guilty and fined $42,000, ordered to pay $7,682 in costs, and required to spend $160,000 on clean up. In 1984, about 40 tons of crude oil spilled into the harbor at Gore Cove after a Shell barge with a tank capacity of 1,217 tons had been over-filled with 1,900 tons of oil. In that case, Shell was found to be negligent and was fined $25,000.

Two years after the Laura D’Amato spill, in hearings on the incident before a New South Wales parliamentary committee, Shell’s Clyde refinery manager Gary Smith, although pointing to improvements in spill response and detection, said he could not guarantee that spills would not occur in the harbor again. "Shell was deeply concerned by the oil spill which occurred in Gore Bay," Smith told the hearing. "We have fully investigated the incident and whilst the investigation team did not find deficiencies in the action of Shell staff or Shell proce-dures, a number of recommendations were made. . .Unfortunately, I can’t give guarantees."

Spying for Shell James Bond he wasn’t, but Manfred Schlickenrieder had the perfect cover for spying on environmental groups – a television camera, hair over the collar, and seemingly good leftist credentials. "Manfred filmed and interviewed all the time," recalled Fouad Hamden, communications director of Greenpeace who later learned that Greenpeace had been had, as they say, by the paid infiltrator. "The bastard was good, I have to admit." In 1996, Schlickenrieder began spying on green groups and their associates for the British oil industry through the high powered London-based firm of Hakluyt & Company, Ltd. Hakluyt was founded in 1995 by former British intelligence agents, with board, management, and affiliated Hakluyt Foundation members from both Shell and British Petroleum. Sir William Purves, former CEO of Shell Transport, served as Hakluyt chairman. Sir Peter Holmes, former Shell chairman, is the current president of the Hakluyt Foundation, which works as a kind of supervisory board. Hakluyt prides itself on its ability to get good current, on-the-ground intelligence for its industrial clients. Shell hired Hakluyt in April 1996 in the wake of Greenpeace’s Brent Spar protest and the subsequent threats and attacks on Shell’s European gas stations. When the story first broke in June of 2001 in London’s Sunday Times, Shell confirmed it had been Hakluyt’s client through December 1996. "We did talk to Hakluyt about what intelligence they could gather," explained Mike Hogan, director of media relations at Shell UK. Schlickenrieder’s assignments on behalf of Shell also included the company’s troubles in Nigeria. He even produced a documentary on Nige-ria, entitled, Business As Usual: The Arrogance of Power, about the envi-ronmental and human rights campaign mounted against Shell. By 1997, however, the action — and Schlickenrieder’s services — had shifted to BP and that company’s drilling in the North Atlantic. Sources: Maurice Chittenden and Nicholas Rufford, "UK: MI6 ‘Firm’ Spied on Green Groups," The Sunday Times (London), June 17, 2001, and, Eveline Lubber, "Big Brother Incorporated," PR Watch, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2002.

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